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Consequences of a Gödel’s misjudgment
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UCAM - Universidad Católica de Murcia, Spain - graguni@ucam.edu
The fundamental aim of the paper is to correct an harmful way to interpret
a Gödel’s erroneous remark at the Congress of Königsberg in 1930. Despite
the Gödel’s fault is rather venial, its misreading has produced and continues
to produce dangerous fruits, as to apply the incompleteness Theorems to the
full second-order Arithmetic and to deduce the semantic incompleteness of its
language by these same Theorems. The first three paragraphs are introductory
and serve to define the languages inherently semantic and its properties, to
discuss the consequences of the expression order used in a language and some
question about the semantic completeness: in particular is highlighted the fact
that a non-formal theory may be semantically complete despite using a language
semantically incomplete. Finally, an alternative interpretation of the Gödel’s
unfortunate comment is proposed.
KEYWORDS: semantic completeness, syntactic incompleteness, categoricity,
arithmetic, second-order languages, paradoxes
1 Formal systems
Often the adjective formal is abused in violation of the original meaning that can rightly
be called Hilbertian. Actually, it is common understanding “formal system” as a synonym
for “axiomatic system”, although no one doubts the need for non-formal axioms in Mathe-
matics. This superficiality, together with the wrong meaning given to certain affirmations
of Gödel, produces the serious mistakes that we will show.
The best definition of a formal system is probably that one given by Lewis in 19181:
A mathematical system is any set of strings of recognizable marks in which
some of the strings are taken initially and the remainder derived from these by
operations performed according to rules which are independent of any meaning
assigned to the marks.
1C. I. Lewis, A Survey of Formal Logic, Berkeley University of California Press (1918), p. 355.
1
So, a framework in which, starting by certain strings of characters with no meaning (the
formal axioms), are produced (deducted) other strings with no meaning (the theorems) by
use of operations (deductive rules) which never make use of any meaning assigned to any
mark. To get from that sort of “abacus” a real scientific discipline, we must interpret - if this
is possible - the characters and strings so that: a) the axioms are true; b) the deductive
rules are sound, ie capable of producing only true meaningful strings, starting by true
meaningful strings. Such an interpretation is said sound model. This conceptualization,
revolutionary for the times, is also present in the contemporary Bernays and Post2 as well
- perhaps for the very first time - in Hilbert, as it can be noted in many passages of his
correspondence with Frege (1899-1900):
[...] It is surely obvious that every theory is only a scaffolding or schema of
concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the
basic elements can be thought of in any way one likes. If in speaking of my
points I think of some system of things, e.g. the system: love, law, chimney-
sweep. . . and then assume all my axioms as relations between these things,
then my propositions, e.g. Pythagoras’ theorem, are also valid for these things.
In other words: any theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of
basic elements.
[...] a concept can be fixed logically only by its relations to other concepts.
These relations, formulated in certain statements I call axioms, thus arriving
at the view that axioms. . . are the definitions of the concepts. I did not think
up this view because I had nothing better to do, but I found myself forced
into it by the requirements of strictness in logical inference and in the logical
construction of a theory3.
Incidentally, the fact that none of the mentioned authors uses rigorously the adjective
formal is not surprising: since for all of them the forthright belief (or hope) was that every
axiomatic theory was formalizable, the formal dressing was nothing more than the correct
way of presenting any axiomatic discipline. Precisely Gödel is one of the first to use the term
carefully and accurately for his attention to distinguish meticulously between Mathematics
and Metamathematics and his consciousness of expressive limits for the formality (which
he self will help to shape). As a matter of fact, even without resorting to the feasibility
of the condition of categoricity (which only applies in non-formal axiomatic systems4), the
non-formal axiomatic theories are necessary to express, and possibly decide, all that the
Mathematics was thought to deal.
2See, for example, the Dreben and Heijenoort introduction to first Gödel’s works in Kurt Gödel collected
works, ed. Feferman et al., Oxford univ. press (1986), vol. 1, pp. 44-48.
3From two Hilbert’s letters to Frege, in: G. Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, ed.
G. Gabriel, et al. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers (1980).
4If we limit ourselves to the consideration of theories with models of infinite cardinality.
The concept of formality requires at least a clarification. The question is simply whether
the formal systems coincide with recursively (or effectively, assuming the Church-Turing
Thesis) axiomatizable systems. When the works of Church and, especially, Turing5 con-
vinced Gödel that the machine models considered by them were, in fact, completely equiv-
alent to his general recursive functions (ie convinced him of the Church-Turing Thesis), he,
in a footnote added in 1963 to the text of his most famous work, wrote:
In consequence of later advances, in particular of the fact that due to A. M.
Turing’s work a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general
notion of formal system can now be given, a completely general version of
Theorems VI and XI [the two incompleteness Theorems] is now possible. That
is, it can be proved rigorously that in every consistent formal system that
contains a certain amount of finitary number theory there exist undecidable
arithmetic propositions and that, moreover, the consistency of any such system
cannot be proved in the system6.
clarifying, in a footnote of this same text, that:
In my opinion the term “formal system” or “formalism” should never be used
for anything but this notion. [...]
The Gödel’s proposal was therefore to coincide, by definition, the effectively axiomatiz-
able systems with the formal systems. Unfortunately, this suggestion was not successful.
Certainly, it is just a matter of convention; but if we maintain the original definition of
formal, the two concepts are different. Consider a theory that deduces only by the classical
deductive rules. Since these rules are mechanizable, the only obstacle for a machine, in
simulating the system, is the specification of the set of axioms: if it is mechanically repro-
ducible, the system will be effectively axiomatizable. On the other hand, on the basis of
definition of formality, the chains to call axioms undoubtedly must be exhibitable but can
be specified in arbitrary way. So, effective axiomatizability implies formality but not vice
versa.
An important example of this case can be built by the formal Peano Arithmetic (PA).
Assuming that such theory is consistent, we can add as new axioms the class of its true
statements in the intuitive (or standard) model. By construction, it forms a syntactically
complete system (PAT ) which, as a result of the first incompleteness Theorem, cannot be
effectively axiomatizable. Nevertheless this system can still be called formal : it is necessary
to give meaning to the sentences just to determine whether or not they are axioms. Once
done, every statement can be reconverted to a meaningless string, since the system can
deduce its theorems without making use of significance. So, really exists a formal system
able to solve the halting problem: cold comfort.
5A. M. Turing, On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem, Proceedings of
the London Mathematical Society (2) 42 (1937), pp. 230-265.
6K. Gödel, On formally undecidable propositions of Principia mathematica and related system I, in Kurt
Gödel collected works, op. cit., vol. 1 p. 195.
2 Semantic languages and non-formal systems
Consider an arbitrary language that, as normally, makes use of a countable7 number of
characters. Combining these characters in certain ways, are formed some fundamental
strings that we call terms of the language: those collected in a dictionary. When the
terms are semantically interpreted, ie a certain meaning is assigned to them, we have their
distinction in adjectives, nouns, verbs, etc. Then, a proper grammar establishes the rules
of formation of sentences. While the terms are finite, the combinations of grammatically
allowed terms form an infinite-countable amount of possible sentences.
In a non-trivial language, the meaning associated to each term, and thus to each ex-
pression that contains it, is not always unique. The same sentence can enunciate different
things, so representing different propositions. For example, the same sentence “it is a plain
sailing” has a different meaning depending on the circumstances: at board of a ship or
in the various cases with figurative sense. How many meanings can be associated to the
same term? That is: how many different propositions, in general, can we get by a single
sentence? The answer, for a normal semantic language, may be amazing.
Suppose we assign to each term a finite number of well-defined meanings. We could then
instruct a computer to consider all the possibilities of interpretation of each term. The
computer, to simplify, may assign all the different meanings to an equal number of distinct
new terms that it has previously defined. For example, it might define the term “f-sailing”
for the figurative use of “sailing” (supposed unique). The machine would then be able, using
the grammar rules, to generate all the infinite-countable propositions. In this case we will
say that, in the specific language, the meaning has been deleted8. More generally we have
this case when the different meanings allowed for each term are effectively enumerable:
even in the case of an infinite-countable amount of meanings, the computer can define an
infinite-countable number of new terms and associate only one meaning to each term in
order to establish a biunivocal correspondence between sentences and propositions. So, the
machine could list all them by combination.
Hence, by definition, we will say that a language is inherently semantic (ie with a non-
eliminable meaning) if it uses at least one term with an amount not effectively enumerable
of meanings; with the possibility, which we will comment soon, that this quantity is even
uncountable. From the fact that a sentence represents more than one proposition if and
only if it contains at least one term differently interpreted, it follows an equivalent condition
for the inherent semanticity: a language is inherently semantic if and only if the set of all
possible propositions is not effectively enumerable.
A first important example of such a language was considered in the previous section. The
fact that the axioms of PAT are not effectively enumerable proves that in the expression
7Finite, as the usual alpha-numeric symbols, or, to generalize, infinite-countable. In this paper we will use
either “countable” or “enumerable” with the same meaning, ie to indicate that there exists a biunivocal
correspondence between the considered set and the set of the natural numbers.
8Just a concise choice rather than the more correct mechanically reproduced.
“true statement in the standard model” the term true has got an amount not effectively
enumerable (although enumerable) of distinct meanings. So, the phrase belongs to an
inherently semantic language.
When the set of all possible propositions is enumerable but not effectively enumerable,
still it is possible to define an amount infinite-countable of new terms and to associate
only one meaning to each term (so re-establishing a biunivocal correspondence between
sentences and propositions); but this operation cannot be performed by a machine. Go
back to the example of PAT : an inherently semantic phrase is used to define all its new
axioms, but then every axiom is formulated by its unique symbolic representation in PA.
Every proposition of PAT corresponding to the expression “true statement in the standard
model” is explicitly replaced with an appropriate formula of PA. So, in this case, the
“definition of new terms” consists precisely in using the formulas of PA to express the
propositions of PAT.
Now consider the case of an inherently semantic language in which all possible proposi-
tions are not enumerable, ie in which there exists at least one term with an uncountable
quantity of meanings. Due to the uncountability of properties of the standard natural num-
bers (N ), ie of the set of all subsets of N, P(N), this case is especially interesting, because
only a language of this kind is capable of expressing these properties. This time it is not
possible to define new terms so to associate to them an unique meaning, because the num-
ber of all possible strings is only countable9 . Not even we can reaccommodate the things
so to re-associate a quantity at most infinite-countable of interpretations to each term,
because in this way we still could get only a countable total amount of sentences. There is
no way to avoid that at least one term conserves an uncountable number of interpretations.
Although that is what really happens in every usual natural language, this feature, at
first, might surprise or even be considered unacceptable. Undoubtedly, all the meanings
that ever will be assigned to any settled word are only a countable number: indeed, finite!
But these meaning cannot be specified once and for all. The fact remains that the pos-
sible interpretations of the term vary inside an infinite collection; moreover, a collection
not limited by any prefixed cardinality. Some classic paradoxes can be interpreted as a
confirmation of this property. The Richard’s one10, for example, can be interpreted as a
meta-proof that the semantic definitions are not countable, ie that they are conceivably
able to define each element of a set with cardinality greater than the enumerable one (and
therefore each real number). The proper technique used in diagonal reasoning, reveals
that the natural language is able to adopt different semantic levels (or contexts) “looking
from the outside” what was “before” defined, namely, what was previously said by the same
9Sometimes the uncountability is interpreted simply as a “non-formalizable countability”, ie achieved by
an inherently metamathematical connection. Even according to this view, however, this “countability”
cannot be capable to assign a different symbolic string to each element of the uncountable set: otherwise,
nothing could prohibit to formalize this function inside the formal Set Theory.
10Where firstly it is admitted that all possible semantic definitions of the real numbers stay in a countable
array and, then, one can define, by a diagonal criterion, a real number that is not present in the array.
language. Identical words used in different contexts have a different meaning and for the
number of contexts, including nested, there is no limit. On the other hand, the Berry’s
paradox clearly shows that a finite amount of symbols, differently interpreted, is able to
define an infinite amount of objects. Here the key of the argument is again the use of two
different contexts to interpret the verb “define”.
Finally, we consider a consistent arbitrary axiomatic system (SA). We wish that SA is
able to express and possibly decide11 all the properties of the natural numbers. In particu-
lar it must be capable to distinguish the properties one from the other, in order to deduce,
in general, different theorems starting by different properties. Admitting, as normally, that
SA makes use of a countable number of symbols, if we interpret the theory in a certain con-
ventional model, this will associate a single meaning to each sentence. So, the interpreted
sentences will be only an enumerable amount and they cannot express all the properties
of the natural numbers. Therefore, the only possibility is to consider a non-conventional
model of the system, able to assign more than a single meaning (indeed a quantity at least
2ℵ0) to at least one sentence; and, then, able to verify the remaining requirements for a
normal model12. That is what really happens in the so-called full second order Arithmetic
(FSOA): its standard model, which can be proved unique under isomorphism, is of this
kind. As we said, this axiomatic system is non-formal. Definitively, no kind of interpre-
tation can allow an axiomatic system to express and study all the properties of the natural
numbers in compliance with formality.
3 Questions about the expression orders
The first-order predicate calculus of Logic13, or briefly first-order classical Logic, is a formal
system which constitutes the structural core (ie the language) of the ordinary axiomatic
theories. In it, the existential quantifiers ∀ and ∃14 only can range over variable-elements
of the universe (U ) of the model. In 1929 Gödel proved the semantic completeness of this
theory, namely, that all the valid (ie true in every model) sentences are theorems15. The
widest generalization of the Gödel’s result is due to Henkin16 and extends the semantic
completeness to every formal system.
The second-order predicate calculus of Logic, or second-order classical Logic, extends the
use of existential quantifiers to predicates, ie to properties of the elements of U. From the
11By “decide a sentence”, we mean to conclude that it or its negation is a theorem.
12As a result, this model cannot be confused with a conventional uncountable model of a formal, and
maintained formal, system. This one, considered for example for PA, will continue to assign only one
meaning to each sentence of the system: an uncountable amount of exceeding elements of the universe
will have no representation in PA.
13Defined by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, Cambridge University Press (1913).
14Really, only one of the two is strictly necessary.
15K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. 1929 and 1930, vol. 1, p. 61 and p. 103.
16L. Henkin, The completeness of the first-order functional calculus, The journal of symbolic logic (1949),
n.14, pp. 159-166.
standpoint of the Set theory, the predicate-variables vary inside the set of all subsets of U,
that is, P(U). In non-trivial cases, U is infinite and consequently P(U) always has got an
uncountable cardinality. If we consider an arbitrary non-trivial axiomatic theory based on
second-order classical Logic, we have thus three fundamental cases:
1. The axioms and/or rules of the theory nevertheless ensure formality. For this purpose
it is necessary (although not sufficient) that they limit the variability of the predicates
within a countable subset of P(U); normally, this is achieved by means of appropriate
comprehension axioms. This case is known as general, or Henkin’s, Semantics.
2. There is no limit for variability of the predicates in P(U). This full understanding is
known as standard Semantics. In any case a non-formal system is obtained, since it
is possible to express an uncountable quantity of sentences.
3. The variability of predicates in P(U) is restricted but not enough to verify the for-
mality. The sentences may be uncountable or countable but, in the latter case, not
effectively.
In the case 1) the theory always is semantically complete; what happens in the remaining
cases?
The FSOA Arithmetic is right an important example of case 2). In it, an induction
principle, valid for “any property of the natural numbers”, is defined as axiomatic scheme.
Definitely, this is a full understanding of the inductive rule, that implies uncountability
for the sentences of the theory. By the way, it is well known that such full understanding
is necessary to achieve the categoricity17. By its categoricity, is immediate to show that
the compactness Theorem, which is a corollary of the semantic completeness Theorem,
does not hold for FSOA. This allows the conclusion that the language of FSOA, ie the
full second-order Logic, is not semantically complete. A more general alternative for this
conclusion is obtained applying the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem (L-S ). In a simplified form
that includes both versions (up and down), the L-S Theorem may be stated in this way:
every system equipped with a semantically complete language and with at least one infinite
model, admits models of any infinite cardinality. Since models of different cardinality
cannot be isomorphic, we have that for a system with infinite models, categoricity and
semantic completeness of its language are two complementary properties, impossible to be
both satisfied.
At this point an explanation is necessary, which, surprisingly, I never have found in any
publication. Either by the invalidity of compactness Theorem or by the L-S Theorem, what
one really concludes is precisely the semantic incompleteness of the language of FSOA, ie of
the full second-order Logic; and not of the system. Not every system that is expressed by the
full second-order Logic (or, more generally, by any other semantically incomplete language)
17A full explanation, for example, in S. Shapiro, Foundations without foundationalism: a case for second-
order Logic, Oxford univ. press (2002), p. 82 and p. 112.
has necessarily to be semantically incomplete18. In particular, for a categorical (non-trivial)
system (which always, by the L-S Theorem, uses a semantically incomplete language), there
is nothing to prohibit a priori that it can be syntactically (or semantically19) complete.
Indeed, such a system, which necessarily will be non-formal, could deduce all the true
sentences using an appropriate kind of inherently semantic deduction20 .
On the other hand, a source of mistakes is undoubtedly the current widespread tendency
to categorize the axiomatic Theories looking at the expression order (first order, second
order, etc.) without making the necessary distinctions. It is in line with the disuse of the
term formal in its pure Hilbertian sense (so used also by Gödel). Regardless to clarify if the
semantics is full (or standard) or general (ie accomplishing the formality) or intermediate
(previous case 3), the systems of second (or more) order are normally considered as those for
which the semantic completeness, and properties related to it, does not apply, as opposed
to those of first order. But, firstly, a first order classic system can own proper axioms that
violate either the semantic completeness or the same formality21. Moreover, Henkin has
shown that under conditions of formality, the semantic completeness applies whatever the
expression order. As we noted in the previous section, the crucial aspect lies in the semantic
consequences of the cardinality of language of the theory, regardless of the expression order.
Now, the only peculiarity related to use of the quantifiers ∃ and ∀ on predicative variables
(or super-predicative, etc.) is that when infinite models exist (so, in non-trivial cases),
these variable - if appropriate comprehension axioms are missing - vary inside uncountable
sets, so creating inherently semantic systems. But comprehension axioms can radically
change the things. A superficial interpretation of the Lindström’s Theorem aggravates
the situation. It states that every classical theory expressed in a semantically complete
language can be expressed in a first-order language. This can is not a must. The theorem
does not prohibit semantic completeness or even formality for a system expressed in an
higher-order language22 . It only states that, when you have this case, the theory can be
re-expressed in a - simpler - first-order language. Certainly, this property stands out the
particular importance of the first-order language23 . But this should not be radicalized. The
grouping of the axiomatic theories based on the expression order is, in general, misleading
their basic logical properties, unless the actual effect of the axioms is considered. Because
18While, conversely, a system that uses a semantically complete language always is semantically complete.
19For a categorical system it is immediate to prove that the semantic and syntactic completeness are
equivalent.
20More in G. Raguní, I confini logici della matematica, ed. Aracne, Roma (2010), pp. 144-145 and 232-233.
21See, for examples: M. Rossberg, First-Order Logic, Second-Order Logic and Completeness, Hendricks et
al. (eds.) Logos Verlag Berlin (2004), on WEB :
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~mr30/papers/RossbergCompleteness.pdf
22For the second order, you can have a semantically complete language without it being formal, in one of
the cases incorporated in previous point 3.
23A near property, on the other hand, is already evident thanks to the expressive capacity of the formal
Set Theory: namely, every formal system, since is fully representable in this theory - which is of the
first order - can be expressed at the first order.
these properties are only a consequence of the premises. The essential tool for classification
remains the accomplishment of the Hilbertian formality.
Starting from the FSOA, the formality can be restored by limiting the induction prin-
ciple to the formally expressible properties, so re-establishing an injective correspondence
between formulas and properties: in this way the system PA is obtained, which however
is unable to express, and therefore also decide, infinite (namely, again 2ℵ0 , since this num-
ber remains unchanged for subtraction of ℵ0) properties of the natural numbers. Now
the induction principle is not longer able to reject all the models not isomorphic to N, so
categoricity cannot be achieved24 . Indeed, it can be shown in at least four different ways
that PA has got non-standard models: 1. by the first incompleteness Theorem together
with the semantic completeness Theorem; 2. using the compactness Theorem; 3. by the
upward L-S Theorem; 4. as a consequence of a Skolem’s theorem of 1933 that concludes
the non-categoricity for PAT 25.
Finally we recall that the incompleteness Theorems are valid for any effectively axioma-
tizable (and therefore formal) system in which the general recursive functions are definable.
Therefore, they can be applied to PA but not to FSOA. For PA, the first Theorem reveals a
further limitation: if one admits its consistency, even between the properties of the natural
numbers that this theory is able to express, there are infinite (ℵ0) that it cannot decide.
4 From error to horror
In the third volume of the aforementioned Kurt Gödel’s collected works, published in 1995,
are collected the unpublished writings of the great Austrian logician. According to the
editors, the document *1930c is, in all probability, the text presented by Gödel at the
Königsberg congress on September 6, 193026.
In the first part of the document, Gödel presents his semantic completeness Theorem,
24See, for example: S. Shapiro, op. cit., p. 112.
25T. Skolem, Über die Unmoglichkeit..., Norsk matematisk forenings skrifter, series 2, n. 10, 73-82, reprinted
in Selected works in logic, edited by Jens E. Fenstad, Univ. di Oslo (1970), pp. 345-354.
26Indeed, in the textual notes of the volume is written (p. 439):
The copy-text for *1930c [...] was one of several items in an envelope that Gödel labelled
“Manuskripte Korrekt der 3 Arbeiten in Mo[nats]H[efte] + Wiener Vorträge über die ersten
zwei” (manuscripts, proofs for the three papers in Monatshefte [1930, 1931, and 1933i ] plus
Vienna lectures on the first two.) On the basis of that label, *1930c ought to be the text of
Gödel’s presentation to Menger’s colloquium on 14 May 1930 - the only occasion, aside from
the meeting in Königsberg, on which Gödel is known to have lectured on his dissertation results
[...]. Internal evidence, however, especially the reference on the last page to the incompleteness
discovery, suggests that the text must be that of the later talk. Since no other lecture text
on this topic has been found, it may well be that Gödel used the same basic text on both
occasions, with a few later additions.
extended to the “restricted functional calculus” (with no doubt27 identifiable with the first-
order classical Logic), which an year before he proved in his doctoral thesis. After this
exposure, he adds:
[...] If the completeness theorem could also be proved for the higher parts
of logic (the extended functional calculus), then it could be shown in complete
generality that syntactical completeness follows from monomorphicity [cate-
goricity]; and since we know, for example, that the Peano axiom system is
monomorphic [categorical], from that the solvability of every problem of arith-
metic and analysis expressible in Principia mathematica would follow.
Such an extension of the completeness theorem is, however, impossible, as
I have recently proved [...]. This fact can also be expressed thus: The Peano
axiom system, with the logic of Principia mathematica added as superstructure,
is not syntactically complete28 .
In summary, Gödel affirms that is impossible to generalize the semantic completeness
Theorem to the “extended functional calculus”. In fact, in this case also the Peano axiomatic
system, structured with the logic of Principia Mathematica (PM ), would be semantically
complete. But since this theory is categorical, would follow that it is also syntactically
complete. But just this last thing is false, as he - surprise - announces to have proved.
Now, regardless of what Gödel meant by “extended functional calculus”, this affirmation
contains an error. We have in fact two cases:
a. If Gödel understands by “Peano axiomatic system structured with the logic of the PM ”
the formal theory PA (or any other formal arithmetical system) the error is precisely
to regard it as categorical.
b. If, however, he alludes to the only categorical arithmetic, that is FSOA, then Gödel errs
applying to it his first incompleteness Theorem.
Of the two, just the second belief has been consolidating but - shockingly - without reporting
the error. Rather, exalting the merit of having detected for the first time the semantic
incompleteness of the full second-order Logic. Surely, to forming this opinion has been
important the influence of the following sentence contained in the second edition (1938) of
Grundzüge theoretischen der Logik by Hilbert and Ackermann29 :
Let us remark at once that a complete axiom system for the universally valid
formulas of the predicate calculus of second order does not exist. Rather, as K.
Gödel has shown [K. Gödel, Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia
27To be convinced, just consult the note 3 in K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. 1930, vol. 1, p. 103.
28K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. *1930c, vol. 3, pp. 27-29.
29English translation by L. M. Hammond et al. in Principles of Mathematical Logic, Chelsea, New York
(1950), p. 130.
Mathematica und verwandter systeme, Mh. Math. Physik Vol. 38 (1931)], for
any system of primitive formulas and rules of inference we can find universally
valid formulas which cannot be deduced.
The echo of the Gödel’s unfortunate words at the Congress pushes the authors (probably
Ackermann, given the age of Hilbert) to attest that the first incompleteness Theorem
concludes precisely the semantic incompleteness of the second-order Logic! False. And
furthermore, this conclusion cannot be derived by that Theorem.
Sadly, today the belief that the incompleteness Theorems even can apply to FSOA and,
above all, that they have as a corollary the semantic incompleteness of the full second-order
Logic is almost unanimous. This can be seen either in Wikipedia or in the most specialized
paper. Even in the introductory note of the aforementioned document, Goldfarb writes:
Finally, Gödel considers categoricity and syntactic completeness in the set-
ting of higher-order logics. [...] Noting then that Peano Arithmetic is cate-
gorical - where by Peano Arithmetic he means the second-order formulation
- Gödel infers that if higher-order logic is [semantically] complete, then there
will be a syntactically complete axiom system for Peano Arithmetic. At this
point, he announces his incompleteness theorem: “The Peano axiom system,
with the logic of Principia mathematica added as superstructure, is not syntac-
tically complete”. He uses the result to conclude that there is no (semantically)
complete axiom system for higher-order logic30.
So interpreting, without a doubt, that Gödel refers to the second-order categorical Arith-
metic. But in this case the incompleteness Theorem could not be applied! Goldfarb
neglects that the full second-order induction principle, the only capable to ensures cate-
goricity, generates an uncountable quantity of axioms, so that the effective axiomatizability
of the system is not verified. As a matter of fact, the FSOA theory could be syntactically
complete.
Sometimes, the semantic incompleteness of the full second-order Logic is “concluded” by
an alternative approach to passing by the (alleged) syntactic incompleteness of FSOA (a
Freudian stimulus?). It is supposed, by contradiction, that the valid statements of the full
second-order are effectively enumerable theorems and then, by applying the incompleteness
(or Tarski’s) Theorem, an absurdity is obtained31 . But this assumption is evidently exces-
sive: semantic completeness of a system, simply requires that all the valid statements are
theorems, not necessarily effectively enumerable theorems. In the present case, conversely,
we already know that this latter condition is impossible, since, as it has been shown, the
30W. Goldfarb, Note to *1930c, op. cit, vol. 3, pp. 14-15.
31Emblematic examples, respectively, in: J. Hintikka, On Gödel, Wadsworth Philosophers Series (2000),
p. 22 and S. Shapiro, Do Not Claim Too Much: Second-order Logic and First-order Logic, Philosophia
Mathematica n. 3, vol. 7 (1999), p. 43.
FSOA is an inherently semantic theory. As a consequence, these proofs really do not con-
clude the semantic incompleteness of the full second-order Logic (as, however, it can be
done by the L-S Theorem or the invalidity of the compactness Theorem).
The main reasons of this unfortunate misunderstanding are due probably to ambiguities
of the used terminology, both ancient and modern.
5 Clearing up the terms
The expression “extended predicate calculus” is for the first time used by Hilbert in the
first edition (1928) of the aforementioned Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik where, with
no doubt, indicates the full second-order Logic. This one was considered for the first
time in the Principia Mathematica (PM ). The belief that Gödel, in the aforementioned
phrase, refers to FSOA (explanation b.), implies that he with “extended functional calculus”
intends the same thing. But in which work he has shown or at least suggested that the
incompleteness Theorems can apply to the full second-order Logic? In none.
In his proof of 1931, Godel refers to a formal system with a language that, in addition to
the first-order classical logic, allows the use of non-bound functional variables (ie without
the possibility to quantify on them)32. Then he proves that this is not a real extension of
the language, able, in particular, to hinder the applicability of the semantic completeness
Theorem. In the 1932b publication, Gödel declares the validity of the incompleteness
Theorems for a formal system (Z ), based on first-order logic, with the axioms of Peano
and an induction principle defined by a recursive function. Certainly not a full induction.
He adds:
If we imagine that the system Z is successively enlarged by the introduction
of variables for classes of numbers, classes of classes of numbers, and so forth,
together with the corresponding comprehension axioms, we obtain a sequence
(continuable into the transfinite) of formal systems that satisfy the assumptions
mentioned above [...]33
speaking explicitly of comprehension axioms and formal systems. Finally, in the pub-
lication of 1934, which contains the last and definitive proof of the first incompleteness
Theorem, Gödel, having the aim both to generalize and to simplify the proof, allows the
quantification either on the functional or propositional variables: a declared type of second-
order. However, appropriate comprehension axioms limit at infinite countable the number
of propositions34 . Gödel never misses an opportunity to point out carefully that always is
referring to a formal system and that, consequently, the statements are enumerable:
32K. Gödel, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 187. The purpose is simply to be able to express formulas such as ∀x(f(x)),
where f is a recursive function, which strictly are not permitted in the first-order classical Logic.
33K. Gödel, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 237.
34K. Gödel, On undecidable propositions of formal mathematical systems, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 353-354.
Different formal systems are determined according to how many of these types
of variables are used. We shall restrict ourselves to the first two types; that
is, we shall use variables of the three sorts p, q, r,...[propositional variables]; x,
y, z,...[natural numbers variables]; f, g, h, ...[functional variables]. We assume
that a denumerably infinite number of each are included among the undefined
terms (as may be secured, for example, by the use of letters with numerical
subscripts).
[...]
For undefined terms (hence the formulas and proofs) are countable, and hence
a representation of the system by a system of positive integers can be con-
structed, as we shall now do35.
Therefore, we are in case 1) of the third section: far from full second-order. Yet, in the
introduction to the same paper, Kleene, in summarizing the work of Gödel, does not avoid
commenting ambiguously:
Quantified propositional variables are eliminable in favor of function quan-
tifiers. Thus the whole system is a form of full second-order arithmetic (now
frequently called the system of “analysis”)36.
But he can mean only that the whole system is a formal version (perhaps as large as
possible) of the full second-order Arithmetic. Maybe is exactly this the “extended functional
calculus” to which Gödel was referring in the examined words at the Congress? We will
discuss it in the next section.
Another source of mistake is probably related to use of the term metamathematics. Al-
though Godel intends it in the modern broad sense that includes any kind of argument
beyond to the coded formal language of Mathematics (and so with the possibility of using
inherently semantic inferences and/or making use of the concept of truth), in his theorems
he employs this term always limiting it to a formalizable (though often not yet formal-
ized) use deductive and, indeed, even decidable. In the short paper that anticipates his
incompleteness Theorems37, for example, Gödel invokes a metamathematics able to decide
whether a formula is an axiom or not :
[...]
IV. Theorem I [first incompleteness Theorem] still holds for all ω-consistent
extensions of the system S that are obtained by the addition of infinitely many
axioms, provided the added class of axioms is decidable, that is, provided for
every formula it is metamathematically decidable whether it is an axiom or not
(here again we suppose that in metamathematics we have at our disposal the
logical devices of PM ).
35Op. cit., p. 350 and p. 355.
36S. C. Kleene, op. cit., p. 339.
37K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. 1930b, vol. 1, p. 143.
Theorems I, III [as the IV, but the added axioms are finite], and IV can be
extended also to other formal systems, for example, to the Zermelo-Fraenkel
axiom system of set theory, provided the systems in question are ω-consistent.
But in both the subsequent rigorous proofs, he will formalize this process, which now is
called metamathematical, using the recursive functions, so revealing that, in the words
just quoted, he refers to the usual “mechanical” decidability. By the same token, even in
the theorem that concludes the consistency of the axiom of choice and of the continuum
hypothesis with the other axioms of the formal Set Theory, he does the same: he uses
the metamathematics only as a simplification, stating explicitly that all “the proofs could
be formalized” and that “the general metamathematical considerations could be left out
entirely”38.
6 An alternative explanation
As noted, Gödel has never put in writing that his proofs of incompleteness may be applied
to the uncountable full second-order Arithmetic and furthermore it looks absolutely not
reasonable to believe that he deems it39. In this section, therefore, we will examine the
other possibility, namely the a. of the fourth section. It, remember, pretends that Godel
in 1930 believed, mistakenly, categorical a kind of formal arithmetic and, in consequence
of his incompleteness Theorems, semantically incomplete its language. Is this reasonable
(or more reasonable than the previous case)?
Certainly not for the system considered by Gödel in his first proof of 1931: in fact, the
semantic completeness Theorem applies to it, as Gödel himself remarks in note no. 55
of the publication40 . Indeed, this is the first time in which the existence of non-standard
models for a formal arithmetic is proved: why Gödel does not report it? The topic deserves
a brief analysis.
As we have observed in third section, apart from the use of the incompleteness Theorems,
the existence of non-standard models for PA can be proved by the compactness Theorem,
the L-S upward one, or a theorem proved by Skolem in 1933 (cited in note no. 25);
actually, this last one resolves that PAT is non-categorical, what a fortiori applies to PA.
The compactness Theorem is due precisely to Gödel (1930) and descends from his semantic
completeness Theorem; but in none of his works Gödel ever uses it41. Moreover, despite its
fundamental importance for the model theory, nobody - except Maltsev in 1936 and 1941
- uses it before 194542. Not much more fortunate is the story of the L-S Theorem. The
38K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. 1940, vol. 2, p. 34.
39I myself have changed my opinion reported in the book [12] and in the paper [13] after a deeper analysis
of the Kurt Gödel’s collected works.
40Op. cit., p. 187.
41This is confirmed by Feferman, op. cit., vol. 1, note n. 23, p. 33.
42This is attested both by Vaught and Fenstad: op. cit., vol. 1, p. 377 and vol. 2, p. 309.
first proof, by Löwenheim (1915), will be simplified by Skolem in 192043. In both cases,
these theorems are downward versions, able to conclude the non-categoricity of the formal
theory of the real numbers and of the formal Set Theory, but not of PA. However, Skolem
and Von Neumann suspect a much more general validity of the result44. It seems that also
Tarski was interested to this argument at that time, probably getting the upward version
of the Theorem in a seminar of 192845. In any case, the argument continues to have low
popularity46, at least until the generalization of Maltsev in 193647, which, including for
the first time the upward version, will allow the general conclusion that all the theories
equipped with an infinite model and a semantically complete language are not categorical.
In this context of disinterest for the topic, Gödel not only is no exception, but his no-
torious Platonist inclination pushes him to distrust and/or despise any interpretation that
refers to objects foreign to those that he believes existing independently of the considered
theory. Which, in all plausibility, also believes unique. As a matter of fact, in the introduc-
tion of his first paper on the semantic completeness, he shows to believe categorical even
the first-order formal theory of the real numbers48.
On this basis, one can surmise the following alternative for the option a. When he discov-
ers the non-categoricity of the formal arithmetical system where his original incompleteness
Theorems are applied, Gödel is not so glad and immediately looks for an extension that,
though formal, is able to ensure the categoricity. Probably he believes to have identified it
in a formal version of the full second order Arithmetic: just that one that will be considered
in his generalized proof of the first incompleteness Theorem of 193449, where quantification
on the functional and propositional variables are allowed, while respecting the formality.
This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that Gödel could admit the possibility that this
language is semantically incomplete, since in both versions of his semantic completeness
Theorem, he does not allow the use of quantifiers on functional variables50. Having in mind
43The respective works, relative to the first-order classical Logic instead of the semantic completeness, are
in: J. V. Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel, Haward University Press (1967), pp. 232 - 251 and pp. 254
- 263.
44Here is an especially interesting remark by Von Neumann in 1925, from An axiomatization of set theory,
in From Frege to Gödel, op. cit., p. 412:
[...] no categorical axiomatization of set theory seems to exist at all; [...] And since there
is no axiom system for mathematics, geometry, and so forth that does not presuppose set
theory, there probably cannot be any categorically axiomatized infinite systems at all.
45This information is due to Maltsev: in his publication of 1936 (cited in a next note), he claims to have
known it by Skolem.
46It is significant, for example, that Hilbert did not mention this theme in the seminary of Hamburg in
1927: The foundations of mathematics, in From Frege to Gödel, op. cit., p. 464.
47A. Maltsev, Untersuchungen aus dem Gebiete..., Matematicheskii sbornik 1, 323-336; English translation
in: The metamathematics of algebraic systems: collected papers 1936-1967, Amsterdam (1971).
48K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. 1929, vol. 1, pp. 61-63.
49K. Gödel, op. cit., doc. 1934, vol. 1, p. 346.
50Op. cit., doc. 1929, 1930 and 1930a, vol. 1, p. 69, p. 121 and p. 125.
this generalization (perfectly definable as “extended functional calculus”), it would explain
why in the meantime he communicates the general result without mentioning the discovery
of non-standard models. For example, just after his famous announcement at the Congress
of Königsberg on September 6, 1930, Gödel declares51:
(Assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) one can even give ex-
amples of propositions (and in fact of those of the type of Goldbach or Fermat)
that, while contentually true, are unprovable in the formal system of classical
mathematics. Therefore, if one adjoins the negation of such a proposition to
the axioms of classical mathematics, one obtains a consistent system in which
a contentually false proposition is provable.
Admitted the soundness, here he evades to mention standard models, perhaps because he
plans a more general proof than that one currently available, valid for a formal arithmetic
believed categorical. A theory that, as announced in the main affirmation under scrutiny,
uses the “extended functional calculus”: inevitably, a semantically incomplete language due
to the syntactic incompleteness together with the (alleged) categoricity.
Anyway, the Skolem’s proof of 1933 should have amazed him: not even the system,
semantically and syntactically complete, of the propositions true for the standard model,
is categorical. A first disturbing evidence that the non-categoricity covers all formal (non-
trivial) systems, regardless of the syntactic completeness or incompleteness. Gödel, in
reviewing the Skolem’s paper, only observes laconically - finally! - that a consequence of
this result, that is the non-categoricity of PA, was already derivable from his incompleteness
Theorems52. Later, in any work (not only in the cited generalization of 1934), he always will
ignore the issue of the categoricity. Equally, apart from the questioned phrase of 1930, he
never will return to state that by his incompleteness Theorems can be derived the semantic
incompleteness of some language.
Finally, the Henkin’s Theorem of 1949 will prove that in every formal system (and so,
anywhere the incompleteness Theorems could be applied) there is semantic completeness
of the language and therefore, if infinite models exist, there can not be categoricity.
7 Conclusions
We summarize briefly the conclusions of this paper:
1. The Richard’s paradox can be interpreted as a meta-proof that the semantic defini-
tions are not countable, ie that they are conceivably able to define each element of a
set with cardinality greater than the enumerable one (so, each real number). Further,
the Berry’s paradox shows that a finite amount of symbols, differently interpreted, is
able to define an infinite amount of objects.
51Op. cit., doc. 1931a, vol. 1, p. 203.
52Op. cit., doc. 1934c, vol. 1, p. 379.
2. An axiomatic system that allows us to express and study an uncountable amount of
properties cannot be formal.
3. The categorical model of the full second-order Arithmetic is an interpretation that,
before satisfying the axioms, associates 2ℵ0 different propositions to at least one
sentence. The result, thus, is a non-formal axiomatic system.
4. An axiomatic system can be semantically complete despite employing a semanti-
cally incomplete language. In particular, the full second-order Arithmetic could be
syntactically (and therefore also syntactically, being categorical) complete.
5. The grouping of the axiomatic theories based on the expression order is, in general,
misleading their fundamental logical properties: these are only a consequence of the
premises. The essential tool for classification remains the accomplishment of the
Hilbertian formality.
6. The text of the Gödel’s communication at the conference in Königsberg on September
6, 1930 (never published by him), contains a mistake. In the common understanding,
not only this error is not reported, but also is wrongly deduced, by it, that: a) the
incompleteness Theorems can also be applied to the categorical Arithmetic founded
on the full second-order Logic; b) the semantic incompleteness of the full second-order
Logic is a consequence of the incompleteness Theorems (or of the ensuing Tarski’s
truth-undefinability Theorem).
7. On the basis of the publications of Gödel and of logic, the previous interpretation is
untenable.
8. As an alternative interpretation of the manuscript in question, it is possible that
Gödel is referring to the formal arithmetic considered in his proof of 1934, in which
the quantification on the functional and propositional variables is allowed. If so,
in 1930 he believed categorical this theory and, as a consequence of its syntactic
incompleteness, supplied with a semantically incomplete language. This explanation
is consistent with the fact that both his original semantic completeness Theorems
cannot be applied to this system, due to the said quantification. This view also
explains why, being with the years more and more evident the difficulty for the
condition of categoricity, he never will repeat similar affirmations.
On the other hand, he never corrected the phrase, plausibly because he might not
have worry about correcting an unpublished text.
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